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T hrough the OMT programme, the ECB had promised unlimited purchases on secondary markets of bonds from selected member 
states, signalling that it would act in effect 
as the Eurozone’s ‘lender of last resort’. 
Although not triggered in practice, the 
availability of OMT apparently stabilised 
the Euro area, calming financial markets 
and reducing ‘irrationally’ high spreads 
on the sovereign bonds of ailing states.
In its decision, the German Constitutional 
Court strongly doubted the legality of 
the ECB’s bond-buying programme. As 
an act of economic policy, it manifestly 
v io lates the distr ibut ion of power 
between the EU and its Member States 
(see paras 63-69) and probably amounts 
to central bank financing of the state, 
prohib i ted by Art ic le  123(1)  TFEU 
(see paras 84-94). But rather than 
a t t e m p t  t o  r e v o k e  t h e  l i c e n s e 
immediately, the German Court, making 
good on an earlier promise, made its 
first ever reference to Luxembourg, 
giving the European Court of Justice an 
opportunity to review the programme 
before rendering a final assessment. A 
judgment from the European Court is 
expected in the summer of 2015
Whether or not OMT was the ‘big 
bazooka’ that was called for to rescue 
the single currency, it was more than 
merely a water pistol, even if launched 
inconspicuously by the ECB in the form 
of a press release. The German court’s 
challenge to the ECB’s competence to 
pursue the programme raises a number 
of questions. If the ECB has no license 
for this type of weapon, will the survival 
of the Eurozone be jeopardised? And if, 
as Chancellor Merkel has insisted, the 
survival of the Euro determines the fate 
of Europe, is the future of European 
integration itself called into question? 
In terms of its economic implications, 
the significance of Karlsruhe’s judgment 
appears, so far at least, to have been 
slight. The OMT, properly licensed or 
not, may have already served its purpose, 
successfully lowering spreads on ailing 
member states.
And yet for the ECJ the stakes remain 
high. Economically, the Eurozone is still 
fragile, even, on some accounts, facing a 
period of ‘secular stagnation’. Although 
the financial markets seemed untouched 
by Karlsruhe’s initial bark, Luxembourg’s 
bite could be a wholly different matter. 
The German Court has provided the 
outlines of a barely lit escape route 
for the ECJ. If the OMT is limited in 
amounts, avoids any debt cuts and 
does not interfere with market price, 
then revocation of its licence may be 
unnecessary. But to the extent that these 
conditions are testable in any meaningful 
sense they would, arguably, make the 
weapon entirely ineffective, and risk 
deepening and prolonging the economic 
crisis in Europe.
Moral Hazard
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
was set up so that the EU would have 
exclusive competence on matters of 
monetary policy, with its Central Bank 
setting short-term interest rates for 
the euro area with the primary goal of 
maintaining ‘price stability’ (Article 127(1) 
TFEU). The Member States, subject only 
to soft-law methods of ‘co-ordination’ 
among them, would retain primary 
economic self-determination, setting their 
own policies on how to tax and spend.
 
The ability of Member States to borrow 
– and so to service their existing debts – 
would be determined by market forces, 
prompting them to maintain budgetary 
discipline, and whatever else matters 
for credit rating agencies. Hence the 
‘no bail-out’ provision in Article 125(1) 
TFEU, which formally seeks to avoid 
the problem of ‘moral hazard’: namely 
the danger that with the availability of 
financial support from elsewhere, states 
would be de-incentivised from keeping 
strict f iscal discipline and investors 
from properly calculating the risk of 
their investments. With national fiscal 
l iabil ity would come national f iscal 
responsibility, supposedly disciplined 
b y  t h e  m a r k e t s  a n d  b u t t r e s s e d 
constitutionally (albeit weakly) by the 
stability and growth pact, which was 
violated almost immediately by France 
and Germany and under-enforced by 
the European institutions.
The bas ic  f ramework of  EMU has 
significantly mutated as a result of post- 
crisis reforms, including the twin pillars of 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
and the Fiscal Compact (TSCG), which 
provide conditional financial assistance 
to beleaguered Member States and 
heightened supervision over national 
budgets respectively.
The legal support for these mutations 
has so far held together, if only just. In 
Pringle, the ECJ rationalised the legality 
of the ESM by positing a higher goal 
of ‘financial stability of the euro area 
as a whole’ (rather than merely ‘price 
stability’). And the strict conditionality 
(‘austerity’) imposed on ESM recipient 
states through the Memoranda of 
Understanding negotiated with the 
‘Troika’ would mitigate any disincentive 
for fiscal discipline that might otherwise 
arise from new funding arrangements. 
But  th i s  support  i s  now ser ious ly 
threatened. OMT might be a step too 
far, jeopardising the strict conditionality 
imposed on debtor states via ESM and 
undermining the principles of budgetary 
disc ipl ine and market rat ional i ty - 
sacrosanct for Germany. And Karlsruhe 
has no truck with the notion that markets 
were pricing Greek debt irrationally due 
to an unfounded fear of reversibility of 
the euro in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis. Here it defers to the scientific 
expert i se  of  i t s  own Bundesbank . 
Greece, on this view, was paying for its 
profligacy, not for the absence of pan-
European solidarity. 
The notion that any higher-level goal 
of financial stability of the euro area as 
a whole could empower the European 
Central Bank is rejected by the German 
Court. The argument that resonated is 
clear: ‘the ECB does not have a mandate to 
defend the Euro by any means’. Avoidance 
of moral hazard and its market logic are in 
danger of being elevated to the status of 
inviolable constitutional norms in Europe. 
The full cost of this to the project of 
integration remains to be seen.
Constitutional Hazard
But does Karlsruhe’s first ever reference 
to the ECJ reveal another kind of hazard? 
Although feted by some as an act of 
judicial comity, it has been described, 
more accurately, as a ‘diktat’, presenting 
the ECJ with an unhappy choice between 
three unpalatable options: invalidate the 
OMT programme; render it ineffective (by 
adopting the escape route offered to it); or 
risk constitutional collision with Germany.
Does the European Central Bank (ECB) have a mandate to do ‘whatever 
it takes’ to save the Euro? Not according to the German Constitutional 
Court, which in February this year delivered its judgment from Karlsruhe 
on the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions programme (OMT). Will the 
European Court of Justice concur, or will it attempt to resist the might of 
the most powerful domestic Court in Europe? 
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In some respects, this confrontation has 
been a while coming. It has long been a 
refrain in European legal scholarship that 
the German court has put up strong, 
if ultimately untested, resistance to the 
authority of EU law, based on concerns 
f irst of human rights, and then of 
democratic legitimacy. 
In this latest round of shadow-boxing, 
however, Karlsruhe is packing an extra 
punch: ‘constitutional identity’. In its 
view, not only is the act of the ECB 
manifestly ultra vires, it also violates core 
constitutional identity, specifically the 
right to vote in the Bundestag, indirectly 
protected via the principle of democracy 
by the ‘Eternity Clause’, article 79(3) GG 
(paras 26-30, 37). Germany’s democratic 
sovereignty in fiscal matters, in the 
Court’s view, would be jeopardised if it 
has to pay, however indirectly, for the 
ECB’s indiscretion. The unconventional 
economics of OMT is therefore caught 
between the rock of ultra vires and the 
hard place of unconstitutionality.
The German Court’s decision is especially 
difficult for the ECJ because it blurs the 
boundaries between the two legal orders, 
national and European. According to EU 
law, the ECJ has exclusive competence 
to rule on the validity of EU acts, such 
as OMT. It does so on the basis of 
EU and not national law, including 
now in accordance with the duty to 
respect national identity in Article 4 
(2) TEU. But separating EU law from 
German constitutional law is far from 
straightforward in this case because the 
question whether the act is a ‘manifest 
and structurally significant transgression’ 
for the purposes of ultra vires seems to 
depend not only upon its effects in the EU 
legal order but also on the constitutional 
identity of Germany (see para 37). 
This means that even if the ECJ interprets 
the OMT programme in a manner 
compatible with EU law (though in a 
manner distinct from that offered by the 
German Court) it could still fall foul of 
German constitutional exceptionalism and 
the German Court could order its national 
authorities, including the Bundesbank, 
to frustrate its implementation. Thus 
Karlsruhe is able to use its leverage to 
place enormous pressure on the ECJ to 
follow its own judgment of the situation. 
This time the dog has ‘bitten’ and not 
merely ‘barked’. 
If it was part of the genius of the German 
court to present its view on European 
integration as a forceful synthesis of 
national and European constitutional 
values, prodding and probing the EU to 
be more responsive to its concerns about 
the legitimacy of the European construct, 
there was little doubt that these concerns 
were genuine, even though aired from a 
German point of view. And therein lies 
the rub.
Some sort of balance must surely be 
sought between the values of European 
community on the one hand and of 
national autonomy on the other. But it 
is doubtful that this can be achieved by 
national high courts declaring ‘unilateral 
opt-outs from European law’ when the 
interests of other member states and the 
EU ‘have no voice at all’. As Fritz Scharpf 
has argued, Karlsruhe’s jurisprudence 
‘appears fundamentally flawed because 
the court has failed to consider its 
generalized implications in the light of the 
Kantian categorical imperative.’ Karlsruhe 
fails, in other words, a version of the 
golden rule of ethics. 
This raises the prospect of what I call 
‘constitutional hazard’, the risk that the 
European construct will be determined by 
the constitutional power of a domestic 
court with disproportionate influence. 
Since the financial crisis, increasing 
imbalances in the structure of the EU 
have threatened the principle of political 
equality of Member States, with fears of 
a ‘German Europe’ now being openly 
articulated. The OMT decision reveals a 
factor aggravating these imbalances, 
‘const i tut ional  power’ ,  where the 
influence of a national constitutional 
court in an asymmetric compound polity 
such as the EU is a feature not of its legal 
authority but its political clout. 
Constitutional hazard is not reducible 
entirely to the fashionable notion of 
German hegemony but must take into 
account the historical particularities of 
of its domestic constitutional settlement. 
But it is deeply ironic that rules of the 
game entrenched to avoid a return to 
dictatorship now empower the German 
hegemon in the world of European 
constitutional politics, pushing and 
prodding the European institutions as well 
as provide a missing channel for Germans 
to voice their Euro-scepticism. 
Economic Messianism
Whatever the ECJ’s response, the German 
judicial challenge to OMT reveals a 
fundamental weakness at the heart of the 
EU’s political constitution. As a result of 
the structure of economic and monetary 
union, the Euro is a ‘currency without a 
state’, lacking the bonds of statehood 
to guarantee its viability. And yet it is 
deemed integral to the success of the 
project of integration, so much so that, in 
times of crisis, unconventional measures 
are effected for its rescue. The Euro has 
become a latter-day emblem of what 
might be called ‘economic Messianism’, 
displacing the ‘political Messianism’ of the 
founding fathers of European Union. The 
Euro is apparently key to the survival of 
the EU, but a monetary project is a poor 
substitute for a community of solidarity 
that normally undergirds the fate of a polity.
It may be that for the German court, such 
matters are to be dismissed as irrelevant 
and irrational. And yet they cannot be 
ignored; to do so would be to yield totally 
to a partial economic worldview, which 
replaces political action and the values of 
European constitutionality with scientific 
expertise (of the Bundesbank) and market 
logic. What is at stake is not, ultimately, 
the defence of a domestic Rechtsstaat 
against a European raison d’État. After 
all, the German Constitutional Court is 
also defending a substantive political 
and economic view, one which values 
price stability, competitiveness, and fiscal 
discipline above all else.
The OMT judgment illuminates the special 
responsibility of the judicial role in Europe, 
with national and European courts having 
to balance issues of complex equality 
of persons and of states in a context 
of increasing economic and political 
imbalances between nations. The ECJ has 
its work cut out.  
It seems unlikely that the ECJ would risk 
direct confrontation with Karlsruhe. But 
if, for the German court the logic of 
European integration remains primarily 
based on imperatives of competitiveness 
and market logic, for the ECJ, this can 
present but one facet of the broader 
European constitutional logic against 
which OMT must be judged. This more 
expansive evaluation must include not 
only imperatives of competitiveness 
and market logic, but also of peace, 
prosperity,  and sol idar ity between 
peoples. The OMT may fai l  a more 
holistic test too, but only in posing it in 
its full constitutional context, can a Court 
properly discharge its duty.
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